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Politicians are disciplined through the electoral system. But this is often not enough to 
eliminate political rents. Economists suggest that competition across governments may also 
help. But intergovernmental competition can take two forms, through tax competition (exit) or 
yardstick competition (voice). We show these two forms may not, and in general do not, work 
in the same direction. Tax competition may reduce the screening properties of yardstick 
competition. 
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 Exit and voice. Yardstick versus ﬁscal
competition across governments.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
In modern democracies, the fundamental way we use to discipline governments
is through elections. Bad or incompetent governments are thrown out of oﬃce
and this threat forces them to behave in the interests of voters. Many observers
however would agree that the electoral mechanism alone may not be powerful
enough to fully achieve these objectives and that additional disciplining devices
on politicians may be helpful. Not surprisingly, the economists’ main contribu-
tion to this debate has been to advocate more competition across governments.
As competition across ﬁrms reduces extra proﬁts in the market, so competition
across governments would reduce political rents. This general idea has taken
two main forms, aptly summarized by Albert Hirschman’s famous distinction
between "exit" and "voice" (Hirschman, 1970). According to the former, peo-
ple may escape from too greedy a government either by migrating altogether,
as in the Tiebout’s tradition, or more realistically, by transferring abroad their
mobile assets (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). It would be diﬃcult to overes-
timate the practical inﬂuence of this idea. For example, in the debate on the
ﬁscal institutions of the European Union, tax competition (on capital) among
member countries is often defended on the grounds of its disciplining eﬀects
1This paper started as a joint research project with Enrico Minelli at CORE in May 2001.
At the time, we were unaware that the topic was already brieﬂy touched in a recent working
paper by Timothy Besley and Michael Smart. When we eventually found out, we thought
their approach and modelling was too close to ours to deserve a separate analysis and we
dropped the project. However, after several years, subsequent discussions with colleagues,
and the fact that our results diverged from theirs in some crucial aspects ﬁnally convinced
me that there may be some value added in making our original work known to the profession.
Thus, I decided to work through our notes and ﬁnish the paper. Enrico Minelli was too busy
at the time to work on the revised version. This is why the paper appears under my name
only. I also wish to thank Alfons Weichenrieder and all participants at the Cesifo Public
Sector Economics of April 2007 for the useful comments. Remaining mistakes are my own.
1on the hefty European governments. But there is also a second version of the
same idea. Competition across governments might also improve the informa-
tion set of voters (Salmon, 1987). With competing governments and correlated
economic environments, citizens may also engage in more relative performance
evaluation (also known as "yardstick competition") across politicians, using ob-
servations about the results of governments of other regions or other countries to
infer something about the quality of their own governments, so reinforcing the
disciplining eﬀects of "voice". According to its supporters, both globalization,
with its increase in correlation across national economies, and increased media
coverage concur to reinforce the practical relevance of this form of disciplining
device. Indeed, tax competition and yardstick competition may also go hand
to hand; in the EU, for instance, the increased integration of markets and pol-
itics, coupled with increased mobility of factors, have certainly worked in the
direction of reinforcing both forms of governmental competition.
Fiscal and yardstick competition have been separately scrutinized at large
in the economic literature, both theoretically and empirically2. We now know
a great deal about their eﬀects on social welfare as well as on their economic
practical relevance. Their link, however, has not been addressed with the same
care. In the debate on ﬁscal federalism, for example, it is customarily taken for
granted that both types of competition would reinforce each other. Decentral-
ization, so is argued, has potentially beneﬁcial eﬀects on governments because
it increases both ﬁscal competition and yardstick competition. But is this true?
Or these two mechanisms interfere the one with the other?
Surprisingly enough, this question has never been raised in the literature,
at least not in formal analysis. The only paper (I am aware of) which brieﬂy
touches this issue is a very recent work by Besley and Smart (2007). However,
they are more generally concerned with the eﬀects of several general ﬁscal re-
straints on voter’s welfare and do not pay detailed attention on this particular
issue. As the topic is relevant, It is instead important to highlight the conditions
under which tax competition and yardstick competition work together or one
against the other. To this aim, in the following I build a model which helps us
focussing more on this issue.
The main results of this paper are as follows. First, I show that there is no
a-priori reason to believe that the eﬀects of the two forms of competition should
necessarily go in the same direction. Fiscal competition works by reducing
the resources a "bad" government can lie his hands on; yardstick competition
works by providing the voter with more information to select between "bad"
and "good" governments. As the two mechanisms are basically diﬀerent, it
is not surprising that they may not go in the same direction. Second, I also
show if there is a general tendency, this clearly points to a conﬂict between
the two forms of competition. Intuitively, ﬁscal competition, by constraining
government’s choices on some tax tools, makes less informative the signal (the
tax rates) that voters could use to select between bad and good politicians
through yardstick competition. In our model, this translates into a larger set
2See the references at the end of paper for a brief introduction to this literature.
2of parameters which would support pooling equilibria (between good and bad
governments) under tax competition than without it. Third, I ﬁnally show by
means of a simple example that there is at least one practical important case
where the two forms of competition unambiguously conﬂict. When public ex-
penditure is particularly rigid downward, because it is formed by public goods
which are deemed as important by voters, increasing tax competition unam-
biguously reduces the informational advantages of yardstick competition. The
situation of many European countries, with their large welfare systems, comes
naturally to mind.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model,
considering both the case with and without tax competition. Section 3 intro-
duces electoral motivations. Section 4 introduces yardstick competition. Section
5 compares the diﬀerent mechanisms and derives the basic results of this pa-
per. Section 6 illustrates our results by means of a simple example and some
simulations. These are also brieﬂy compared with the Besley and Smart (2007)
results in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
To ease comparison, the model I focus on is the canonical one used in this type
of literature, ﬁrstly introduced in a seminal paper by Besley and Case (1995)
and then developed by a number of other authors. The only diﬀerence is that
I enrich the tax structure of the economy, as this is the focus of the present
analysis. Consider then an economy with a large number of identical consumers
(voters). Each consumer derives utility u(.) from a private good c ,a( p e r
capita) public good g and leisure x =( 1−l),w h e r el indicates labor supply. As
customarily in political economic models (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2000), I
assume the quasi-linear form
u = c + H(g)+V (1 − l)
so as to eliminate income eﬀects on both the consumer’s demand for the
public good and the supply of labor. Both H(.) and V (.) are increasing and
strictly concave functions of their arguments. Each consumer owns one unit of
leisure and one of a private good, which we later identify with "capital". This
unit of capital can be invested earning a ﬁx return. To save notation, I just set
this ﬁx return equal to one. Labor wage is also normalized to one. Governments
can then raise tax revenue by taxing either or both capital and labor income;
the consumer’s budget constraint can then be written as:
c =( 1− T)+( 1− t)l
where T and t indicate, respectively, the tax rate on capital and on labor
income and T,t∈ [0,1]. Governments can then use tax revenue to either produce
the public good and/or to accumulate political rents. The production function
of the public good is stochastic: one unit of revenue produces   units of public
good when the shock is positive and   units of the public good when the shock
3is negative, with  > > 0. Positive shocks occur with probability q>0.
Government’s budget constraint is:
r =( T + tl) −
g
 
where r indicates (per capita) rents and   = { ; }. Governments come of
two types. They are either Welfarist governments (or "good" governments)
or they are Leviathan governments (or "bad" governments). The former are
only interested in maximizing the utility of the consumers; the latter are only
interested in maximizing political rents. Good governments occur with ex ante
probability θ>0. For technical reasons (in order to guarantee the existence of a
pooling equilibrium in pure strategies in all cases considered below, see below),
I assume thorough the paper that θ>1
2 >q . The respective utility functions of
the two types of government is then:
W(T,t,g)=u(T,t,g)
and
L(T,t,g)=r = T + tl −
g
 
where, again to save notation, I here use u(T,t,g) to indicate the indirect
utility of the representative consumer given government ﬁscal choices.
In order to solve the model, let us begin the analysis with the simplest case
where the economy is closed (consumers cannot export their capital abroad)
and lasts only one period, meaning that the incumbent government is in charge
for all the period. I assume the following time line. At stage 0, nature moves,
choosing a realization for   and a type of government; at stage 1, the incumbent
government moves, by choosing the tax rates on capital and labor; at stage
2 consumers make their choices and so tax revenue is also determined, and
ﬁnally at stage 3 the incumbent government decides how to split this revenue
between rents and public good supply. As usual, the model is solved by working
backward. The last choice is a particularly simple one. Welfarist governments
do not receive any utility from rents, so they always choose r =0 , and use all
tax revenue to ﬁnance public good supply. Viceversa, Leviathan governments
do not care for public expenditure, and so they choose g =0and use all tax
revenue to accumulate rents. Going up at stage 2, private sector’s choices are
also particularly simple. If the economy is closed, capital can only be invested at
home, so that the only choice the consumer needs to make at this stage concerns
her labor supply. The consumer then maximizes
max u =( 1− T)+( 1− t)l + H(g)+V (1 − l)
l
taking (T,t,g) as given3.T h eﬁrst order condition gives:
3Tax rates have already been chosen, and the single consumer is too small to aﬀect g in
any way.
4(1) (1 − t) −Vx(1 − l∗)=0
where thorough the paper subscripts indicate derivatives and asterisks opti-
mal values. Solving , we get :
l∗ =1− V −1
x (1 − t) ≡ L(t)
where concavity of V (.) implies Lt(t) < 0. For future reference let us indicate
with e σ(t) ≡− ((Lt(t)t)/L(t)) the tax elasticity of labor supply, and let us also
assume e σt(t) > 0 so as to guarantee the second order condition for government
maximization (see below)4.
Finally, at stage 1, the incumbent government chooses taxes by taking into
account the eﬀect of these choices on the behavior of the consumer in the second
period. If the incumbent government is a Welfarist, he would then choose (T,t)
so as to maximize:
W(T,t,g)=u(T,t,g)=( 1−T)+(1−t)L(t)+H( (T +tL(t)))+V (1−L(t))
Using (1), the ﬁrst order conditions for this problem5 can be written as:
(2) T : −1+ Hg(.) ≥ 0,T ≤ 1
(3) t : −L(t)+Hg(.) (L(t)+tLt(t)) = −L(t)+Hg(.) L(t)(1 − e σ(t)) ≤ 0,
t ≥ 0.
Note that if the optimal choice in (1) is such that T∗ ≤ 1,H g(g∗)=1
 ;
substituting in (3), we get −e σ(t)) < 0, implying t∗ =0 . This makes perfect
sense; a Welfarist government would never choose a distorting form of taxation
such as the labor tax, if it had at its disposal (enough) of a no distorting source
of revenue such as the capital tax. Let us assume this to be the case for any
possible realization of  .
However, the realization of   will generally aﬀect the optimal level of public
good supply and the capital tax chosen by the Welfarist government. To see
how, and for future reference, suppose for a moment that   is a continuous
variable and let us diﬀerentiate (2) with respect to   :
(4) dT
d  = −
Hg + gHgg





  (1 − 1
µ)= T





¯ ¯ ¯ > 0 is the elasticity of the marginal utility for public
expenditure (e.g. the reciprocal of the price elasticity of the demand for the
public good ( 1
µ), if the public good could be bought on the market). It follows:
4Labor economists usually deﬁne a (net) wage elasticity of labor supply as σ(w) ≡
−((Lw(w)w)/L(w)), where w is the net- of-tax wage. In the present model, w =( 1− t),
so that e σ(t)= t
1−tσ(1 − t). Notice that e σt(t) > 0 even if the net wage elasticity of labor sup-
ply is a constant that does not depend on t.I will use this constant wage elasticity formulation
in the simulations of section 6 below.
5For simplicity subsidies are ruled out.
5(5)
dg
d  = d
d ( T( )) = T +  (dT




In words, the faster the marginal utility of public good consumption falls
when public good is reduced, the more the consumer would be willing to pay
to avoid this reduction. Hence, the capital tax is larger or smaller when the
shock is positive depending on µ being larger or smaller than one; and public
expenditure is larger when the shock is positive. Note however that if µ 7−→ ∞
(the demand for the public good is perfectly rigid), the optimal g is unaﬀected
by the shock. In this case, the public good is so important for the consumer that
even in the presence of a negative shock, capital tax is raised to as to guarantee
an unchanged level of public good supply. We will come back to these results
later.
We can then summarize the choices of the welfarist government in the
ﬁrst period as aG = {t =0 ,T = T∗( ),g= g∗( )} where g∗( )=H−1
g (1
 ) and
T ∗( )=g∗( )/ .
The choices of the Leviathan government are even simpler, as the shock
does not aﬀect tax revenue. Whatever the realization of  , the Leviathan would
simply maximally tax the consumer so as to maximize its rents. Its preferred
choices are then aB =
©
t = b t,T =1 ;g =0
ª
,w h e r eb t is implicitly deﬁned by the
condition e σ(b t)=1 .
These choices for the Leviathan are of course rather extreme. One may well
image that there are reasons, perhaps constitutional limits on taxation or the
simple threat of a revolution, that would forbid even a Leviathan government
from completely expropriate his citizens. One could easily introduce these fea-
tures in the model by imposing an exogenous maximum level on the rents a
Leviathan can raise, and/ or by introducing a minimum level of public good it
has to provide. Nothing essential would change in our results here. However,
as will soon be apparent, the assumption of an untamed Leviathan is the one
which goes mostly against the main point I make here. So in the following I
stick to it.
In this simple model, the consumer is then well oﬀ if the incumbent gov-
ernment happens to be a Welfarist; he is completely exploited if the incumbent
government happens to be a Leviathan. Which would be the eﬀect of opening
the economy, so as to allow for capital mobility and tax competition across
countries? In the second stage, the consumer would now also have the choice
of exporting her capital abroad. Clearly, whatever the capital tax chosen by
governments in the ﬁrst stage, her best choice would be to move her endowment
of capital so as to equalize the net-of-tax-return from capital across countries;
as an eﬀect, if capital is perfectly mobile, any capital tax at home larger than
the capital tax applied abroad will drive away all capital from the country. In
a (Bertrand) competitive equilibrium across countries, the tax on capital could
then only be set equal to zero everywhere. Under less extreme assumptions
(various forms of mobility costs), governments would retain some ability to tax
capital, but capital taxation would drive away part of the capital from the
country.
6To avoid unnecessary complications, I capture this eﬀe c th e r eb yj u s ta s s u m -
ing that when the economy is open, the tax base of the capital tax is reduced
to 0 ≤ β<16. What would then be the eﬀect on governments’ choices and
consumer’s welfare? If β<T ∗( ) for any realization of  , and the incumbent
government is a Welfarist, the latter would now need to use the distorting la-
bor tax to ﬁnance public expenditure. Equation (3) would now hold as an
equality, and the optimal level of public good would then be determined by
the equation Hg(gc∗)= 1
 (1−e σ(tc∗)) ,w h e r egc∗ =  (β + tc∗L(tc∗)).U n d e r t a x
competition, the optimal choices of the good government would then become
aGc = {t = tc∗( ,β),T = β, g = gc∗( ,β)}, where the superscript ”c” here is
just a reminder to the reader that these are the optimal choices under tax
competition. Note that in the formulas, I write the optimal t and g as function
of β (in addition to  ) to indicate that the force of tax competition (the amount
of capital tax base driven away by capital taxation) will generally aﬀect the
optimal choices for both the public good and the labor tax. If the incumbent
government is instead a Leviathan, under tax competition, its preferred choices
would simply become aBc =
©
t = b t,T = β;g =0
ª
.
Is the consumer better oﬀ or worse oﬀ as an eﬀect of tax competition?
The answer clearly depends on the type of government. If the government
is a Welfarist, tax competition makes her certainly worse oﬀ,a ss h eh a sn o w
to pay for the dead-weight loss of taxation (in addition to tax revenue) and
generally enjoys less public good7. She is instead better oﬀ if the incumbent
government is a Leviathan, as she can now at least save some of her resources
from expropriation. Clearly, there exists a value of θ
∗, 0 <θ
∗ < 1, such that tax
competition is ex ante welfare improving if θ<θ




This is the usual textbook story; but it is clearly too simple a story. In a
democracy, bad governments are (sometimes) voted down by voters. Hence,
6O n ec o u l da l s om a k et h em o r er e a l i s t i ca s s u m p t i o nt h a tβi is continuos function of tax-
ation, positing βi = β(Ti,T −i) and assuming that β is a non increasing function of own
country tax rate, Ti. However, this would greatly complicate the algebra without adding any
new particular insights to the point I am making here.
7More precisely, and leaving aside the eﬃciency eﬀects of capital mobility across countries,
consumers as a whole would be better oﬀ if capital mobility were prohibited, but each single
consumer would be better oﬀ if she could escape taxation alone, leaving the other taxpayers
to foot the bill. In an atomistic economy, free-riding behavior under capital mobility pushes
the economy in a second best equilibrium. Naturally, by considering a single period model,
we are also leaving aside problems of time consistency in capital taxation. If we reintroduced
these features into the model, then of course tax competition could play a positive role even if
governments were fully benevolent (see for instance Persson and Tabellini, 2000 chapter 12).
We are implicitly assuming here that governments have full commitment powers, which for
developed countries make sense enough.
7even Leviathan governments may wish to reconsider their behavior, to avoid
being thrown out of oﬃce and losing the opportunity to accumulate future
rents. Following the literature, in order to capture these electoral incentives, I
now just assume that the economy lasts two periods (or alternatively, that there
is a term limit for holding oﬃces). In the ﬁrst period, things work precisely as
described above, the only diﬀerence being that at the end of this period (that
is, after the vector of political choices (T,t,g) has been realized) there is now
an election, and the incumbent is either re-elected or he is substituted by an
opponent. In the second period, whatever government is in charge, it will again
select (T,t,g) following the three stages process described above. The world
ends with the end of the second period. To provide electoral incentives to
Leviathans, I also suppose that the realization of θ and q at stage 0 of the ﬁrst
period are private knowledge to governments; as usual, citizens only know the
stochastic structure of the economy. Again, for simplicity, I also suppose that
Welfarist governments do not play strategically; whatever the realization of the
shock, they just do what is better for their citizens in that period8. This will
allow me to ﬁx out-of-equilibrium beliefs in a simple way in what follows.
As this is a dynamic game with incomplete information, the relevant notion
of equilibrium is given by Bayesian Nash perfect equilibria; that is, equilibria
where the strategies of each agent (the two types of incumbent government, the
voter, and the opponent) are optimal given the strategies of any other agent,
and where, whenever is possible, beliefs are sequentially rational in the sense
that they are revised according to Bayes’ rule. Similar game have already been
solved several times in the literature (see in particular Besley and Case , 1995
and Bordignon et als., 2004 ) and the same arguments apply here too; so let us
go through the solution quickly.
The model is solved backward. In the second period, as there are no elections
at the end of the period, the equilibrium is exactly as the one described in the
previous section. If the second period incumbent is a good government, it will
choose aG in the second period (or aGc if there is tax competition); if the second
period incumbent is a Leviathan, it will choose aB (resp. aBc if there is tax
competition). Matters are diﬀerent in the ﬁrst period. At the end of the ﬁrst
period, the consumer will revise her beliefs about the type of the government on
the basis of the observed choices in this period. Let η(θ,T,t,g) be the probability
the consumer assigns to the incumbent government to be a good government at
the end of the ﬁrst period, as a function of her initial belief about the type of
government (equal to the ex ante probability that the government is a Welfarist)
and ﬁrst period choices (T,t,g). Clearly, the best strategy for the consumer is
to re-elect the incumbent if η(θ,T,t,g) is greater than θ, the ex ante probability
that the opponent is good, and it is to elect the opponent in the opposite case.
That is, the citizen votes for the incumbent if η(θ,T,t,g) >θ ;s h ev o t e sf o r
the opponent if η(θ,T,t,g) <θ . For simplicity, I also assume that the citizen
votes for the incumbent when indiﬀerent, that is when η(θ,T,t,g)=θ.T h i si s
8For similar models where good governments also play strategically see Bordignon and
Minelli (2001) and Coate and Morris (1995).
8eﬀectively equivalent to rule out mixed strategies equilibria from this game9.
To pin down the beliefs of voter outside the equilibrium path, note ﬁrst
that the assumption that the Welfarist government does not play strategically
allow us to conclude that η(θ,T,t,g)=0for (T,t,g) / ∈ aG (or (T,t,g) / ∈ aGc if
there is tax competition). If the voter observes in the ﬁrst period choices that
would never be possibly taken by the good government, she can only rationally
conclude that these choices must come from a Leviathan government. In turn,
this makes the options for the Leviathan government very simple in the ﬁrst
period. It might either try to mimic the good government, making choices
that this government could also have taken in some cases in the ﬁrst period
and hoping that this will result in a re-election; or it may make some diﬀerent
choices, and in this case he knows for sure that he is going to be defeated at the
election. In the latter case, of course, the best thing to do for the Leviathan is
to go immediately for its preferred choices and set aB (resp. aBc if there is tax
competition) in the ﬁrst period too.
What the Leviathan government actually does in the ﬁrst period depends
on the realization of the shock and on how much he discounts future. Suppose
that the rate of discount for the bad government is δ<1, meaning that one unit
of rent in the second period only counts for δ units of rents in the ﬁrst period.
Let us consider ﬁrst the case without tax competition. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h e
shock is negative. By the government’s budget constraint, which is known to
the voter, if the Leviathan wishes to mimic the good type, he cannot choose
the tax rate and the public good independently (say, a high tax rate and a low
public good) because otherwise the voter would immediately understand that
it is accumulating rents and would punish it at the ensuing elections. Hence,
if the shock is negative, the Leviathan can only choose either what the good
government would do in this case (that is, t =0 ,T = T∗( ) and g∗( ) ), or
by exploiting its superior knowledge about the realization of the shock, it can
pretend that the shock has been positive, and choose what the good government
would do in this case (that is, t =0 ,T = T∗( ),g∗( )) .B u ti ti se a s yt os e et h a t
if the shock is negative both strategies are dominated for the Leviathan by the
strategy of separating immediately and choosing aB in the ﬁrst period. In fact, if
the Leviathan chooses t =0 ,T = T∗( ) and g∗( ),i t sﬁrst period rents are zero,
and even under the optimistic belief that it would then be re-elected for sure, the
Leviathan would be better oﬀ by deviating immediately, as future rents count
less than present ones: (1 + b tL(b t )) >δ (1 + b tL(b t )). If instead the Leviathan
pretended that the shock has been positive, and taxed accordingly, his ﬁrst
period rents would actually be negative (r = T∗( ) −
g∗( )
  = T∗( )(1 −  
 ) < 0)
and again it would be better by deviating immediately. Hence, if the shock is
negative, the dominant choice for the Leviathan in the ﬁrst period is to separate
from the good type, choosing its preferred choices immediately and losing the
elections.
Matters are diﬀerent if the shock is positive. If the Leviathan played the
choices of the good type in this case, T∗( ) and g∗( ), his rents in the ﬁrst period
9See again Bordignon and Minelli (2001) for a discussion of this issue.
9would of course again be zero. But if it pretended instead that the shock has
been negative and chose T∗( ) and g∗( ) instead, it could earn positive rents:
T ∗( )−
g∗( )
  = T∗( )(1−
 
 ) > 0. Notice that ﬁrst period rents when mimicking
are just a percentage of total tax revenue; to highlight this fact and to simplify
notation, let us then write T∗( )(1 −
 
 ) ≡ φR( ) where φ ≡
( − )
  and R( ) is
just a reminder for total tax revenue when the shock is negative and there is no
tax competition.
If the Leviathan knew that it were elected for sure by playing this strategy, it
would play it if φR( )+δ(1+b tL(b t)) ≥ (1+b tL(b t )) or if δ ≥ (1−
φR( )
(1+b tL(b t))) ≡ δ
∗10.
To know which would be the Leviathan’s electoral possibilities if it played these
strategies, consider then voter’s behavior. The rational voter would of course
know that Leviathan governments are playing this strategy. In equilibrium,
upon observing {t =0 ,T = T∗( ),g= g∗( )} , by Bayes’ rule, her ex-post beliefs
about the type of government can be computed as:
(6) η(θ,T∗( ),t=0 ,g∗( )) =
θ(1−q)
θ(1−q)+(1−θ)q
The voter then votes for the incumbent if η(θ,T∗( ),t=0 ,g∗( )) ≥ θ; that
is, if 1
2 ≥ q, which in our case holds true by assumption.
Consider now the case with tax competition, so that the capital tax can
at most be equal to β. It is easy to see that the previous argument would
go through unchanged. It would still be true that if the shock is negative,
the Leviathan government would prefer to separate immediately in the ﬁrst
period, and that if instead the shock is positive, by pretending that is neg-
ative, the Leviathan could earn positive rents in the ﬁrst period by playing
{t = tc∗( ,β),T = β, g = gc∗( ,β)}. The only diﬀerence is these ﬁrst rents
w o u l dn o wb eg i v e nb y(β + tc∗( ,β)L(tc∗( ,β)))(1 −
 
 ) ≡ φRc( ). Equation
(6) would also remain unchanged, meaning that if the Leviathan plays t =
tc∗( ,β),T = β, g = gc∗( ,β) he knows that it is going to be re-elected for sure.
Finally, the Leviathan would now ﬁnd this strategy convenient if (φRc( )+δ(β+
b tL(b t )) ≥ (β + b tL(b t )) or if δ ≥ (1 −
φRc( )
(β+b tL(b t))) ≡ δ
∗c.
We can then sum up these results by stating:
Proposition 1 "Suppose the economy lasts two periods and the good govern-
ment only does what it is good for the voter in each period. If the shock is
negative, then the only pure strategies Bayesian Nash perfect equilibrium of the
game is one where each type of government plays its preferred choices in each
period, resulting in the incumbent Leviathan to be defeated at the elections. If
the shock is positive, providing that δ satisﬁes some conditions, then there exists
a Bayesian perfect Nash equilibrium where the Leviathan government plays in
10Again, I assume that the Leviathan plays the mimicking strategy when indiﬀerent to rule
out mixed strategies. Bordignon and Minelli (.) and Besley and Smart (2007) also consider
mixed strategies in a related type of models.
10the ﬁrst period the corresponding strategies of the good type of government for
the negative shock. At this pooling equilibrium, the Leviathan is re-elected for
sure. These conditions are δ ≥ δ
∗ under no tax competition and δ ≥ δ
∗c under
tax competition, where δ
∗ =( 1−
φR( )




4Y a r d s t i c k c o m p e t i t i o n
Hence, elections are not enough to tame Leviathans completely. Under the
conditions stated in Proposition 1, Leviathan governments can still harm voters
in the ﬁrst period and be re-elected for sure in the second period. As argued in
the Introduction, this is the point at which most economists would step in and
advocate for more competition across governments. Tax competition clearly
does make a diﬀerence to the electoral game: as we have just shown, in general,
δ
∗ 6= δ
∗c. But before discussing how tax competition aﬀects the electoral game,
let us consider ﬁrst the second form of competition, yardstick competition. Can
this help citizens?
To see this, suppose then that we now double the previous economy, form-
ing a second economy exactly identical to the ﬁrst. Perhaps, as argued in many
studies in ﬁscal federalism, this could simply be the result of a decentralization
process, where some functions originally performed by a single government, the
central level, are now delegate to a number of local governments. Or perhaps,
in the European context, this may be the result of a political process, which
leads national voters to look at what happens in other related countries in order
to form a judgement about the quality of their governments. Of course, for the
consumer to be able to learn something about the type of her government by
observing the choices made in the other jurisdictions, the two economies must be
somehow related; for simplicity, I consider here the simplest case where the two
economies are perfectly correlated, meaning that the realization of the produc-
tive shock at the ﬁrst stage is the same in both economies11. I assume instead
that the choices by nature of the type of government in the two economies are
independently made.
The game evolves as follows. At stage zero of the ﬁrst period, nature chooses
both the realization of the shock (common to the two economies) and the types
of governments in the two economies. Each government knows the realization of
the shock and his type; it does not observe the type of the government chosen
in the other jurisdiction12. At stage 2 of the ﬁrst period, both governments
independently and simultaneously select the tax rates for their economy. Then
citizens make their moves and tax revenue and public good supply are realized.
11Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2004) and Besley and Smart (2007) consider partial
correlation.
12This is a bit far-fetched; presumably, a politician may know something more about the
characteristics of a fellow politician than the common voter. But notice that unless this
knowledge is perfect, our main results below would still go through.
11Elections simultaneously take place in both economies. The second period is
identical to the ﬁrst, with the only diﬀerence that there are no elections at the
end of this period. The game ends here.
As in the previous section, let us still suppose that welfarist governments
in the two jurisdictions do not play strategically. Which would then be the
behavior of the bad governments in the ﬁrst period? Consider ﬁrst the case
without tax competition. By repeating the previous argument, it is easy to
show that, by dominance, if the shock happens to be negative, the best choices
for the two Leviathans would still be to grab as much as possible immediately
and accept to be defeated at the ensuing elections. But if the shock is positive,
the Leviathan can still earn the positive rents φR( ) by pretending the shock
has been negative 13. If mimicking in this case is a convenient choice for the
Leviathan, it depends again on the discount rate and the behavior of voters.
The posterior beliefs of the voters in jurisdiction i, ηi, are now a function of
the choices observed in both economies: ηi = η(θ,Ti,t i,g i,T j,t j,g j) i,j =1 ,2.
At an equilibrium where both Leviathans are known to play the good type’s
negative shock choices when the shock is positive, these beliefs can be derived as
follows. If the voter observes anything diﬀerent from either (t =0 ,T∗( ),g∗( ))
or (t =0 ,T∗( ),g∗( )) in her economy, she knows for sure that her incumbent is a
bad type as the good type would never make these moves (ηi =0 ) . If she observes
(t =0 ,T∗( ),g∗( )), she knows for sure that her incumbent is of the good type
as the bad type would never make these choices (by dominance), and ηi =1 .
If she observes (t =0 ,T∗( ),g∗( )) in her economy, but (t =0 ,T∗( ),g∗( ))
abroad, she would immediately understand that her incumbent government is
a Leviathan who is attempting to fool her (ηi =0 ) . If instead she observes
(t =0 ,T∗( ),g∗( )) in both economies, her revised beliefs can be derived by
Bayes’ rule as follows:
(7) η(θ,(t =0 ,T∗( ),g∗( ))(t =0 ,T∗( ),g∗( ))) =
θ2(1−q)
θ2(1−q)+(1−θ)2q
It follows that the voter would elect the incumbent in this case if θ ≥ 1
2,
which in our case holds true by assumption. Hence, the expected utility of
the Leviathan by playing this strategy is φR( )+( 1− θ)δ(1 + b tL(b t ));t h e
Leviathan would then play this strategy, if this expected utility is larger than
the utility of deviating immediately and collecting the maximal rents, that is if
δ ≥ δ∗
(1−θ).Repeating the same argument for the case of tax competition, it is
immediate to see that everything would go through except that the condition
for pooling would now become δ ≥ δ∗c
(1−θ). We can then state:
13Notice that if we had allowed the tax base of capital to be a negative function of the tax
rate, a Leviathan pretending to be hit by a negative shock may be further punished by tax
competition. This is so because if the other government is a welfarist and chooses instead
a lower capital tax (as would be normally the case if the shock is positive) the Leviathan
would ﬁnd himself with less rents in the ﬁrst periods, as part of his capital would ﬂow abroad.
Predicting this, the Leviathan would be less willing to pool in the ﬁrst period. We leave this
extension to further research.
12Proposition 2 "Suppose there are two identical, perfectly correlated economies,
with independently chosen types of governments. If the shock is positive, provid-
ing that δ satisﬁes some conditions, then there exists a Bayesian perfect Nash
equilibrium where the Leviathan governments play in the ﬁrst period the cor-
r e s p o n d i n gs t r a t e g i e so ft h eg o o dt y p ef o rt h en e g a t i v es h o c k . A tt h i sp o o l i n g
equilibrium, the Leviathan is re-elected for sure, if the other government also
happens to be Leviathan, and he is defeated otherwise. These conditions are
δ ≥ δ∗
(1−θ) under no tax competition and δ ≥ δ∗c








Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2, we can immediately state:
Proposition 3 There exists an interval of values for δ where pooling equilibria
under yardstick behavior do not exist, while they exist in the model without















Proposition 3 then illustrates the basic eﬀect of yardstick competition; it
allows citizens to better select between diﬀerent types of governments14.B y
knowing that it will be found out with higher probability when cheating, the
Leviathan prefers to deviate immediately in a larger number of cases, thus
providing citizens with useful information for the ensuing elections. Observe
that this information does not come freely. The Leviathan now exploits more
fully the citizen in the ﬁrst period than it would do if it had some chances
of re-election; and since the future advantages for citizens are uncertain (they
depend on the realization of the type of the elected opponent), it may well be
that citizens end up by being worse oﬀ (even in expected terms) as a result of
yardstick competition. These issues are discussed in greater details by Besley
and Smart (2007), who emphasize the trade oﬀ between the disciplining eﬀect
and the selection eﬀect of the electoral competition. I directly refer the reader
to their paper for more discussion. I just limit myself here to note that is
not entirely obvious that social welfare is the adequate normative criterion in
this framework. Perhaps, in political matters, the issue of transparency in the
quality of politics is so important to be paramount to considerations of social
welfare. Notice however that the discussion on the normative eﬀects of yardstick
competition does not aﬀect my main point here, which has instead to do with
14Strictly speaking, this is not always true. Although the conditions on the discount rate
for pooling are unambiguously more restrictive under yardstick competition than without it,
the conditions deriving from Bayes’ rule are more ambiguous. For instance, if contrary to our
assumption we had θ>1/2,b u tq<1/2, we could not have pooling as an equilibrium solution
in pure strategies in the model without yardstick competition. But these results look rather
implausible, at least when correlation across economies is perfect. See Bordignon, Cerniglia
and Revelli (1994) for further details.
13the positive eﬀects of tax competition and yardstick competition on political
equilibria.
5 Yardstick versus tax competition
We are then ﬁnally ready to make our comparison. Unambiguously, at least in
our (reasonable) model, yardstick competition works by helping the electoral
screening process; that is, by providing more information to citizens on the
quality of their governments, and therefore by enforcing more separation in
the ﬁrst period between diﬀerent types of incumbents. Which are the eﬀects
of adding tax competition to this framework? To help clarify issues, let me
propose the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4 I say that tax competition and yardstick competition reinforce
each other if the interval of parameters which support pooling equilibria in the
ﬁrst period further shrinks as an eﬀect of introducing tax competition in the
model; I say that tax competition and yardstick competition interfere one with
the other in the opposite case.
Referring back to Propositions 1 and 2, it is clear that these two cases can be
assessed by simply comparing the conditions on the discount rate for supporting
pooling equilibria in the two cases, with and without tax competition. That is,
Proposition 5 Tax competition interferes with yardstick competition if δ
∗c <
δ
∗; tax competition reinforces yardstick competition in the opposite case.
That is, tax competition interferes with yardstick competition, or more gen-
erally (as can be seen by proposition 1), with the screening properties of the elec-
toral process, if as a consequence of the increased capital mobility and reduced
capital revenue, it increases the range of parameters which support pooling equi-
libria in the ﬁrst period. Tax competition reinforces yardstick competition in
t h eo p p o s i t ec a s e .
By recalling the expression for δ
∗c and δ
∗above, it is not a fortiori clear
whether tax competition interferes or reinforces yardstick competition. On the
one hand, tax competition reduces the rents that the Leviathan can earn by
mimicking the good type in the ﬁrst period and also reduces the rents that the
Leviathan can earn in the second period if he manages to be re-elected. Both
these forces push towards more separation in the ﬁrst period. On the other
hand, tax competition also reduces the rents that the Leviathan can grab in the
ﬁrst period if he decides to deviate and plays his favorite strategy. This force
pushes toward more pooling in the ﬁrst period.




∗ if b tL(b t) < (>)
g∗c(β)−βg∗(1)
g∗(1)−g∗c(β)
where in (8), for notational simplicity, I just dropped the dependence of g(.)
on   as it is known that both levels of public expenditures are evaluated at
  =  . (The case with no tax competition is captured in (8) by writing β =1
in g(.) ). Equation (8) highlights a number of interesting features. First, any
exogenous constraint on the maximal tax rate the Leviathan can raise, or on
the minimum level of public good he has to oﬀer, resulting in a lower maximum
levels of rents (i.e. r<b tL (b t )+1 ) and therefore in a fall of the RHS of (8),
would certainly work towards more pooling under tax competition.T h a ti s ,a s
anticipated above, our assumption of an untamed Leviathan is the one which
works mostly in favour of greater separation as a result of tax competition.
Second, the numerator on the expression on the RHS is certainly non negative.
To see this, just note that g∗c(β) >  β , g∗(1) =  T∗ and  β −  βT∗ ≥ 0 as
T ∗ ≤ 1. Third, the denominator is also certainly not negative as g∗(1) ≥ g∗c(β).
It follows that both elements in the two sides of (8) are certainly positive.
Intuitively, there are two main forces at play in determining which of the
two sides of (8) is the greatest. The ﬁrst hinges on the importance of public
expenditure for voters. If voters value the public good very highly, so much that
in spite of having to use a distorting tax to ﬁnance public expenditure under
tax competition, the Welfarist government would still attempt not to reduce
too much public good supply, so that g∗(1) is not too far from g∗c(β), then the
expression on the RHS of (8) would become very large, pushing toward more
pooling under tax competition. The reason is simple. If g∗(1) is not very far
from g∗c(β), the rents that the Leviathan government can accumulate when
pooling in the ﬁrst period do not fall very much under tax competition (since
these rents are proportional to revenue and therefore to public expenditure).
Hence, since the rents that he can grab by separating unambiguously instead
fall under tax competition, the Leviathan government is led to pool more in the
ﬁrst period.
The second force hinges on the elasticity of the labor tax base. If this
elasticity is very high, g∗c(β) will be much smaller than g∗(1) , rents when
pooling in the ﬁrst period for the Leviathan will fall a great deal, and the
expression on the RHS will tend to become smaller. This will push toward more
separation in the ﬁrst period. But notice that the eﬀect of a high elasticity of
the tax base it is not so simple. If the elasticity of the labor tax is very high,
the expression on LHS of (8) (tax revenue at the apex of the Laﬀer’s curve) will
also fall, pushing toward more and not less pooling in the ﬁrst period.
To see these eﬀects more precisely, consider an inﬁnitesimal relaxing in tax
competition, which we could capture as an inﬁnitesimal increase in β. To ease
notation and without loss of generality suppose   =1in what follows. Diﬀer-
entiating equation (3) (which would hold as an equality under tax competition)
with respect to β, and using a ﬁrst order approximation, we can then write:
15(9) g∗ − g∗c ≈
g∗ce σt
µL(t)(1−e σ)+g∗ce σt (T∗ − β)
where the ﬁr s te x p r e s s i o no nt h eR H So f( 9 )i se v a l u a t e da tt h eo p t i m a l
tax choices for the Welfarist government under tax competition and   =   =1 .
The two forces discussed above are clearly represented in this formula. The
ratio on the RHS of (9) is between zero and one. If e σt is very small and/or
µ (the elasticity of marginal utility) is very large, the RHS of (9) will tend to
zero, meaning from (8) that tax competition will certainly induce more pooling
behavior. On the other hand, if the tax base is very elastic (meaning that
the elasticity of the tax base increases very quickly as t increases), the RHS
of (9) will tend to one, and the RHS of (8) will tend to its minimal value
β(1−T ∗)
T ∗−β . However, in this case, the LHS of (8) will also fall, making the total
eﬀect generally ambiguous. Getting general results from (8) is diﬃcult. To gain
further insights, in the next session, we recur to some examples and simulations.
6 Simulations
An analytical example.
Let us ﬁrst suppose that µ =1(e.g. H (g)=l o g ( g)). Than g∗ = T∗ =1
and g∗c =( 1− e σ). Suppose further that e σt = k>0 so that e σ = kt. Equation
(9) can then be rewritten as g∗ − g∗c = kt∗ = k
L(t∗)+k (1 − β) which implies
(1−kt∗)=t∗L(t∗)+β by the government’s budget constraint. Notice that this
last expression can also be rewritten as (1 − β)=t∗(L(t∗)+k). In turn, under
the above hypotheses, the RHS of (8) can be rewritten as
1−kt∗−β
kt∗ ; substituting
from the previous expression, we g e tt h a tt h eR H So f( 8 )r e d u c e st o
L(t∗)
k .
Consider now the LHS of (8). b t is implicitly deﬁned by the condition 1=e σ(b t),
or b t =1





Let us now consider a second example, which allows for more variations in
the fundamental parameters. Let us suppose the citizen’s utility function takes




σ ,w i t hµ<0, and where the absolute value
of µ is the (constant) elasticity of the marginal utility of the public good, as
deﬁned above, and σ is the (constant) net of tax wage elasticity of labor supply
(see note 4). With such an explicit functional form, one can derive the optimal
solutions in the diﬀerent cases and directly compute the two sides of (8). In
particular, L(t)=( 1− t)σ and b t = 1
1+σ, so that b tL(b t)= 1
1+σ( σ
1+σ)σ.A s s u m i n g
  =1 ,it also follows that g∗(1) = 1,s ot h a tT∗ is also equal to 1. g∗(β) can
be directly computed from (3) as a function of {β,µ,σ}. I computed (8), by
running several simulations (around 500) for diﬀerent values of {β,µ,σ} in the
16range 0.1 ≤ β ≤ 0.9, 0.1 ≤ µ ≤ 2 and 0.1 ≤ σ ≤ 215. The table below presents
a sample of the results 16.
Table 1. Computing (8) for diﬀerent values of {β,µ,σ}.
In the table lhs and rhs indicate, respectively, the LHS and the RHS of (8)
µβσb tg ∗ lhs rhs β σ b tg ∗ lhs rhs
2 0.1 0.2 0.83 0.66 0.58 1.68 0.9 0.2 0.83 0.99 0.58 8.87
1 0.1 0.2 0.83 0.63 0.58 1.41 0.9 0.2 0.83 0.98 0.58 4.5
0.5 0.1 0.2 0.83 0.57 0.58 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.83 0.97 0.58 2.3
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.83 0.39 0.58 0.47 0.9 0.2 0.83 0.93 0.58 0.49
2 0.1 2 0.33 0.25 0.15 0.20 0.9 2 0.33 0.95 0.15 0.83
1 0.1 2 0.33 0.24 0.15 0.19 0.9 2 0.33 0.93 0.15 0.45
0.5 0.1 2 0.33 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.9 2 0.33 0.92 0.15 0.24
0.1 0.1 2 0.33 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.9 2 0.33 0.90 0.15 0.05
Values computed for   =1 ,implying T∗ = g∗(1) = 1.
The picture that emerges from the Table, and more generally from the entire
set of the simulations, is quite clear. The key parameter, as suggested by our
discussion above, is µ, the elasticity of the marginal utility of the public good
(or the reciprocal of the price elasticity of the demand for the public good). For
0.4 ≤ µ, that is, when the demand for the public good is not too elastic (less
than 2.5), the RHS of (8) is always larger than the LHS, irrespective of the
values set for the other parameters, implying that tax competition interferes
with yardstick competition. When 0.1 <µ≤ 0.3, we get mixed cases, with the
LHS which tends to become larger than the RHS, the more wage elastic is labor
supply (e.g. the higher is σ) and the stronger is the eﬀect of tax competition on
capital ﬂights (that is, the smaller is β). Finally, for an extremely elastic demand
for the public good, µ =0 .1, (implying a price elasticity of 10 for the demand
of the public good) it is almost always the case that the RHS of (8) is smaller
than the LHS, meaning that tax competition reinforces yardstick competition.
Summing up, the results of these exercises clearly point toward a tendency
for tax competition to lead to more pooling in the ﬁrst period, so interfering
with yardstick competition and more generally with the screening properties of
the electoral process. In the simulations above, it is only for an implausibly
high elasticity of the demand for the public good that yardstick competition
and tax competition can work in the same direction, by increasing separation
among types. Otherwise, the opposite is true and the two diﬀerent forms of
competition among governments tend to work one against the other. Perhaps,
the simplest way to understand our results is the following. As argued by Besley
and Smart (2007), elections have both a disciplining eﬀects —forcing governments
to behave more in the interests of voters— and a selection eﬀect —allowing citi-
zens to discriminate between good and bad governments. Tax competition and
15I wish to thank Umberto Galmarini for his assistance in running these simulations.
16The complete set of simulations is available from the author on request.
17yardstick competition aﬀect this trade oﬀ in opposite directions. Tax competi-
tion, by reducing the resources a bad government can expropriate, clearly works
in the direction of strenghtening the disciplining eﬀect of the electoral process.
Yardstick competition, by enlarging the information set of voters, works by re-
inforcing the selection eﬀect of the electoral process. Putting them together, it
is then not too surprising that the two forms of government competition tend
in general to interfere one with the other.
7 Coming at terms with Besley and Smart (2007)
Our conclusions here may look surprising in the light of Besley and Smart’s
results, which seem to point out to a diﬀerent relationship between tax com-
petition and political equilibria17. In particular, in section 4 of their paper,
they clearly state that "increasing ineﬃciencies in the tax system can lead to a
move from a pooling to a separating equilibrium" (Besley and Smart, 2007:763),
where in their view increasing "ineﬃciencies in the tax system" may also be the
result of "an intensiﬁcation of tax competition". On the contrary, all our re-
sults here are drawn by the fact, as shown in our proposition 1, that in general,
unless µ is very small, tax competition leads to more pooling equilibria. But
these apparently contrasting results are easily explained by considering the dif-
ferences in the modelling choices. Besley and Smart are not interested in tax
competition as such and therefore do not model explicitly, as I do here, the
eﬀect of tax competition on tax revenue. In their model, the utility of voter is
simply written (in their notation) as W = G−µC(x), where W is the utility of
voters, G is public goods, x is tax revenue, C(.) is an increasing strictly convex
function, and µ is the marginal cost of public funds. Thus, when they study
the eﬀects of introducing, or increasing, tax competition on the equilibria of
their model, they do it by just raising µ, the marginal cost of public funds, a
change which according to the two authors may also capture several other possi-
ble factors (a technological change in the ability to collect taxes, the passage of
a constitutional restriction on the tax base, a citizen’s initiative which restricts
the use of speciﬁc tax instruments etc., see Besley and Smart (2007: 762)). But
in this search of generality, they fail to recognize that tax competition, diﬀer-
ently from some of the other possible factors which may also aﬀect the marginal
cost of public funds, in general also inﬂuence the resources that a Leviathan can
grab when separating. Speciﬁcally, while in our model the maximum resources
a Leviathan can expropriate under tax competition are given by β + b tL(b t ),
and so clearly depend on the force of tax competition (which reduces β,t h e
capital tax base), in Besley and Smart these resources are ﬁx e da n dg i v e nb y
17In a section of their paper, Besley and Smart (2007) also brieﬂy discuss of yardstick
competition. But they do so by ruling out by assumption separating equilibria, which makes
it diﬃcult to compare their results with mine. Moreover they never explicitely compare the
eﬀects of yardstick and tax competition, which is our main point here.
18an exogenous value, X. This explains their result. As in our model, tax compe-
tition reduces the rents that a Leviathan can appropriate when mimicking the
good government (which in our model falls from φR( ) to φRc( ); see section 4);
but, diﬀerently from our model, where tax competition also reduce the maximal
rents from separating, in their case these rents are ﬁxed, which obviously pushes
toward more separation as a result of tax competition.
Thus, the diﬀerence in the results is a consequence of the diﬀerence in the
modelling assumptions. The question is then which modelling assumption is
more convincing for the problem at hand. To me, it just seems implausible to
assume that the maximal rents a Leviathan can grab are independent of the
extent of tax competition. Indeed, all the thrust of the Public Choice School ’s
argument for supporting tax competition as a way to discipline governments, is
based on the idea that tax competition reduces the ability of bad governments
to expropriate citizens. So, it is unclear to me how one could examine this
argument in a formal model by assuming it away.
8C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Elections are the main way used in democracies to discipline governments.
Economists argue that competition among governments may also play a use-
ful role. But governmental competition can take two forms; either through tax
competition or through yardstick competition. In this paper, I develop a simple
model which allows me to study the eﬀects on political equilibria of both forms
of governmental competition. The paper shows that the two forms of competi-
tion may, and in general do, conﬂict one with other. Tax competition reduces
the rents a Leviathan can expropriate, but as an eﬀect, generally supports more
political equilibria where the citizen is unable to distinguish between good and
bad politicians. Yardstick competition allows citizens to better distinguish the
quality of the incumbent governments and so to better select between politi-
cians, but in order to work it requires that diﬀerent politicians make diﬀerent
choices. When both forms of competition are present, they tend to interfere one
with the other. The screening properties of yardstick competition are reduced
when tax competition is also present, as tax competition forces politicians of
diﬀerent qualities to make more often similar choices. It follows that it is in
general unjustiﬁed to advocate for both forms of governmental competition at
the same time, as it is routinely made in the ﬁscal federalism literature.
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